Operation Jaywick

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CHINA SEA-MALAYA AREA INTRODUCTION

Operations in the Malaya-China Sea area differ from operations in the other areas in two respects:

1. They were, as far as Malaya was concerned, outside the SWPA, and as far as the China Sea was concerned, GHQ was little interested. The actual boundary was the coastline of China, French Indo-China, Siam and Malaya.

2. The operations were, though not entirely disconnected, the subject of no master planning. They were largely handled by DU and Lt- Col Campbell (D/GS) personally, and since SEAC land forced were involved, Force 136 of that command was closely concerned with the majority of them.

Rimau was part of a much wider project, Hornbill, which provided for a base in the Natuna Islands and attacks on shipping in French Indo China ports simultaneously with the Rimau attack on Singapore. This was Lt-Col Lyon’s original plan which was finally reduced to just Rimau as the full plan was beyond the resources available. The preliminary reconnaissance of the Natunas for Hornbill, known as Kookaburra, was therefore abandoned.

SRD coordinated administratively and in stores and training with the despatch from Exmouth Gulf of Carpenter Party, a Force 136 party for insertion in East Malaya. This party is included below.

JAYWICk, SINGAPORE hARBOUR SEP-OCT 43

Jaywick originated in India and was carried out for SEAC by ISD. In Jul 42 Capt Lyon of the Gordon Highlanders arrived in Australia from India with a plan for an attack against enemy shipping in Singapore Harbour, intending to recruit personnel for the operation in Australia. Maj HA Campbell, Administrative Officer for the expedition, arrived in Melbourne during Aug 42. After arrangements had been made with the Naval authorities, personnel were selected from Flinders Naval Depot. On 15 Aug 42 training, which continued for four months, was commenced in a special camp near Sydney.

The motor vessel ‘Krait’, selected for the Jaywick operation had been brought as deck cargo from India specifically for the task. The vessel had formerly been the property of a Japanese fishing concern in Singapore and was designed to act as a fish carrier and supply ship for sampan fishing in the Anambas. After the fall of Singapore she had been employed in Sumatra rescuing refugees until the surrender of the NEI when she was sailed to India.

She was a wooden vessel of 70 feet with very little beam (only 11 feet) which made her an uncomfortable craft in bad weather. When first taken over she was powered with a Deutz four cylinder engine but was later fitted with a Gardiner Diesel 6L3 of about 103 hp. Her top speed was about 6 1/2 knots and her range 8000 miles.

After training had been completed and when the ‘Krait’ was on her way up the east coast of Australia, she developed serious engine trouble, which necessitated the installation of a new engine. This setback considerably delayed the departure of the expedition and it was not until late in 1943 that the vessel was ready to leave.

The party comprised:

Maj (later Lt-Col) I Lyon (BEF) Lt DN Davidson (RNVR) Lt HE Carse (RANVR) Lt RC Page (AIF) Cpl A Crilly (AIF) Cpl RC Morris (BEF) Leading Stoker JP McDowell (RN) A/Leading Seaman KP Cain (RAN) Leading Telegraphist HS Young (RAN) A/AB’s WG Falls (RAN) A/AB’s AW Jones (RAN) A/AB’s AW Huston (RAN) A/AB’s SW Marsh (RAN) A/AB’s M Berryman (RAN)

At 1400 hrs on 2 Sep 43, the ‘Krait’ sailed from Potshot Base in Exmouth Gulf, Western Australia, bound for the Rhio Archipelago. By nightfall she was clear of the Gulf and was steering a course that would take her about 50 miles west of a direct line between Exmouth Gulf and Lombok. A fresh, southerly breeze, which had been blowing for 24 hours, produced an unpleasant sea on the port quarter. It was the crew’s first opportunity to gauge ‘Krait’s’ qualities as a sea boat in her overloaded state. Despite removal of the deck armour, she rolled heavily and was very sluggish in her recovery. On one occasion lying over until a man standing beside the wheelhouse found himself waist deep in water. By the following morning, conditions had returned to normal.

The first danger area was in the vicinity of the Lombok Strait, between Lombok and Bali islands. ‘Krait’ was routed through this strait which it was expected would be guarded by patrol vessels and aircraft. The party hoped to slip through the strait at night under cover of darkness and the seasonal haze. On approaching Lombok however, it was very evident that, far from their being any haze, the weather was perfect. Lyon decided therefore, to ignore the threat of air reconnaissance aircraft and to make a direct approach.

On 8 Sep 43, in conditions of perfect visibility, ‘Krait’ approached to within 20 miles of Palau Nusa Besar, an island at the southern entrance to the Straits, without sighting any enemy activity. On entering the strait, ‘Krait’ experienced the exceptionally strong south-flowing tidal stream of these waters and for some hours her progress was negligible. In the late evening she took 4 hours to pass the 4 mile coastline of Nusa Besar. Under Dutch rule this island had been almost uninhabited except for a tiny settlement in the northwestern corner. It seemed now however to be a centre of activity, numerous controlled fires and moving lights being observed.

During the night with the north bound tide the vessel made good progress and at dawn was steaming through the northern entrance to the strait, about 9 miles from Lombok and 11 miles from Bali. On the Lombok coast a slight ground haze reduced visibility. Close inshore were some small sailing craft, but of patrol craft there was no sign. The Bali coast was clearly visible, but there was no sign of activity. By 1000 hrs the seasonal haze developed, and under cover of this ‘Krait’ slipped out into the Java Sea on a course to take her north of the Kangean Islands.

The passage of the Lombok Strait was the first test of the disguise afforded by ‘Krait’. Her outward appearance was that of a normal Japanese fishing craft. To heighten the disguise, the members of the party had dyed their skin and dressed as natives. After this test, Jaywick party felt reasonably secure in their disguise.

Through the Java Sea the voyage was dull and uneventful. ‘Krait’ lumbered along at 6.5 knots in hazy weather, sighting nothing but the occasional sail. Some Macassar prahus were seen on easterly and westerly courses, but were avoided.

Massalembo Island was passed in darkness during the early morning of 10 Sep 43, and a course was set for Tg Sambar, and thence coastwise to the Karimata Group, off the SW coast of Dutch Borneo. These islands were reached at dawn on 14 Sep 43 and ‘Krait’ found herself amongst numerous junks and fishing craft. A course was set for the Temiang Straits.

As they were trying to pick up land in the early hours of 16 Sep 43 they sighted their first shipping. A large tanker passed a quarter mile ahead on a northerly course. She was blacked out and gave no sign of having sighted ‘Krait’.

Sailing through the straits, they made for Pompong Island, one of the many islands in the vicinity and which had been selected as a possible transshipment area.

Here the survivors of HMS ‘Kuala’ had spent a miserable week in Feb 42. They had reported it uninhabited, with water, and the Jaywick party had decided to use it as a base from which to look for a suitable hideout for ‘Krait’.

A reconnaissance showed however that neither Pompong nor any of the islands in its immediate vicinity were suitable, and so it was decided to investigate some of the islands of the Rhio Archipelago, which lies between Pompong and Singapore itself. ‘Krait’ arrived at Pompong Island in the early afternoon of 16 Sep 42, and later crossed to Bengku Island. Here the dinghy was lowered to take soundings around the coastal reef in the hope of finding a passage by which ‘Krait’ could get close inshore. While they were working, a low-flying Japanese float plane passed close by, but took no notice of the party.

That evening they returned to anchor at Pompong, Events had led to the conclusion that peace-time conditions prevailed around Singapore and that the safest role for ‘Krait’ was to rely upon her disguise without any further attempt at deception. It was decided that she be kept moving in unfrequented waters taking care to avoid all contact with natives and never appearing twice in the same locality during daylight hours. It was considered that the cumulative effect of native gossip was a far greater risk than were casual enemy patrols. It was decided therefore, that the canoeists be landed the following night and that the ‘Krait’ return to the coast of Dutch Borneo to fill in time.

After dark, much enemy activity in the form of searchlights, float planes and transport aircraft, made it obvious that they were in a very active area. Searchlights were showing from Chempa Island, fifteen miles SW of Pompong. At dawn ‘Krait’s’ lookout reported the sound of aero engines being warmed up, and shortly afterwards two enemy float planes passed overhead. It was obvious that the formerly undefended Lingga Island Group now contained a float plane base. This emphasized more than ever, the necessity to off-load the expedition and despatch ‘Krait’ post-haste to Borneo. The mast was lowered to decrease the vessel’s visibility, but while they were stowing the rigging and gear some natives in a canoe were seen approaching. ‘Krait’ was got underweigh immediately and headed north at a slow speed.

Jaywick had planned to arrive at Durian, the original canoe hide-out, after dark, but the unfortunate arrival of the natives left ‘Krait’ a whole day in which to cover a distance of only 30 miles. To kill time she sailed north until close to the Petong Islands and then eastward to Galang Bahru. Two miles from shore they sighted a new building with an observation tower alongside it. ‘Krait’ apparently aroused no suspicion and unchallenged, they cautiously altered course until heading as though bound from Sumatra to Singapore.

North of Galang Bahru lies the island of Palau Panjang. Previously passing along its western shore they had noticed some sandy coves and no signs of habitation.It seemed preferable that, having already explored the local dangers, they should use this island as their canoe base, rather than risk unknown dangers around Durian.

Not knowing whether they had been reported by the Galang Bahru observation post, they were committed towards maintaining their course towards the Bulun Strait for the three remaining hours of daylight. Shortly before dusk they were off Tg Klingking, five miles north of Panjang, when a launch was sighted approaching ‘Krait’. The crew stood to action stations, but the launch passed them about 1 mile distant and evidenced no interest.

By nightfall ‘Krait’ was in the entrance to the Bulan Strait and only 21 miles from Singapore. The glow of Singapore’s lights could be seen reflected in the clouds. Certain that they could no longer be seen, the engine was silenced and ‘Krait’ headed back towards Panjang, in a rising storm which obliterated all landmarks. Navigation was greatly helped by the lights on the inhabited fish traps, the positions of which had been noted on the northern passage.

At Panjang a suitable anchorage was found, and by 0500 hours on 18 Sep 43, all operational gear and personnel, together with stores, food and water for one month, had been landed. ‘Krait’ thereupon weighed anchor and sailed for Borneo with instructions to rendezvous at Pompong Island between the hours of dusk and dawn on the night of 1/2 Oct 43.

On arrival at the Panjang base Jaywick had been able to ensure only that there was cover and no sign of habitation. At dawn a more extensive reconnaissance showed that there was a village about a quarter mile away on the other side of the island, but there was no sign of any track leading to the bay (Otter Bay) where they had made their camp.

The stores were carried back about 25 yards into the jungle, and camp was pitched beside a waterhole. By noon the reserves of food were hidden in a cliff-face. On returning to camp they found that an army of hermit crabs had effectively obliterated their tracks in the sand. A sentry was posted at all times in an OP and all reported the usual activity of small junks, fishing craft and aircraft.

As they had landed at their base a day ahead of schedule, the rest of 18 Sep 43 and all of 19 Sep 43 were spent resting and relaxing. On 20 Sep 43 stores and equipment were checked in preparation for starting at dawn.

Departure on their mission was delayed by the passage of a 70 foot patrol launch, a mile to seaward of the bay. On the two previous nights, the noise of her exhaust had been heard at regular intervals, so the party were not unduly worried by her presence.

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The canoes were loaded with food and water for one week, and with operational stores and men, the cargo’s total weight was approximately 700 lbs. With such a cargo the canoes sat very low in the water and were very sluggish.

The operational party proceeded in three canoes; No. 1 carrying Lyon and Huston, No. 2 Davidson and Falls and No. 3 Page and Jones. They were to paddle under cover of darkness to a selected island at the extreme north of the Rhio Archipelago, from where the attack was to be made.

At dusk on 20 Sep 43 the party set off in close arrowhead formation, Lt Davidson navigating. By midnight Palau Kaloh was reached, and having covered a distance of ten miles in the canoes, the party decided to find a camping place. Palau Bulat, 2 miles to the north was selected. The rest of the night and the following day were spent here observing the passage of small craft in and out of the strait, under conditions of such safety that it was possible to allow bathing.

At dusk on 21 Sep 43 the canoes left Palau Bulat and paddled up the Bulan Straits, but owing to constant alerts at unfounded dangers, poor progress was made. After travelling 12 miles, they were obliged to shelter at Palau Bulan, a sand-fly infested swamp, to avoid being caught in the open water in daylight. It was a bad hideout. Throughout the day small boats passed by and the party was exactly opposite a village on the island of Boyan which was only 300 yards away. They spent an uncomfortable day.

On the evening of 22 Sep 43 they made excellent progress and by 2030 hrs they had reached the end of the strait. Ahead could be seen the lights of Palau Sambu, formerly a Dutch oil depot, 5 miles south of Singapore. The canoes steered a course south of Sambu, arriving at Palau Dongas, the island chosen for their forward OP at about midnight. Dongas lay about 8 miles SSW of Singapore Harbour. It was jungle- covered, with an extensive swamp on the south side. It was uninhabited and had only one landing place, a narrow inlet in the swamp with a sandy cove at its head. A sand spit ran back into the swamp providing every facility for concealment and some comfort.

A daylight reconnaissance revealed that the high ground on the north side of the island provided an excellent location for an OP and that drinking water was available in a disused well.

On 23 Sep 43 an OP was established opposite and 8 miles distant from Kollang and in conditions of good visibility, it was possible to see into Keppel Harbour, Singapore’s Roads and Examination Anchorage. A night watch was kept until 2300 hrs, revealing no signs of defensive activity. In Singapore there was no blackout and the lights of cars driving down Beach Road could be clearly seen. There were no harbour or navigation lights burning and all ships were stationary. Much of the day was devoted to rest.

On 24 Sep 43, a constant watch was maintained from the OP. In the harbour and roads there was much movement of shipping and vehicles. During 5 days of observation there was at no time less than 100,000 tons of shipping in the area, and the freedom of movement enjoyed by medium draught native craft showed that the minefields had not been laid in the harbour. It was decided to wait until there was a considerable concentration of shipping in one place before carrying out the attack.

During the late afternoon of 24 Sep 43 a concentration totalling 65,000 tons assembled in the Roads area opposite Dongas. It was realised that unfavourable tides would render an attack extremely difficult, but the target was so tempting that it seemed imperative to try. Therefore at 2000 hrs the canoes left Dongas and proceeded towards the target area. No patrols were encountered nor any enemy activity noted, until a weak searchlight from the direction of the city, probably situated in the Cathay Building, cast its beam towards the canoes, remaining stationary for about half a minute. Apparently the canoes were not observed, as nothing further happened. As the party approached the target, the current increased in strength. It soon became obvious that the canoes could not battle against it, and at 0100 hrs the attack was abandoned. Progress had been too slow and it was decided to return to Dongas to await more favourable conditions. Canoes No. 2 and 3 managed to reach Dongas before daylight without mishap. Lyon’s canoe however, was taken eastwards by the current and reached land just as dawn was breaking. To avoid detection the crew hid among some boulders in a swamp. As it rained consistently they spent a most uncomfortable day. When darkness permitted movement they rejoined the main party at 1900 hrs.

As it appeared that weather and tides unfavourable for an attack from Dongas would continue for a few days, Lt Davidson on 25 Sep 43 planned an immediate move to an alternative hideout, from which an attack could be launched the following night under more favourable conditions. His prompt action in making this decision was a decisive factor in the ultimate success of the operation.

On the night of 25 Sep 43 the party moved to the west past Sambu, arriving shortly before dawn at Palau Subar, a small bracken-covered island overlooking the Examination Anchorage. Here an OP was established and the party rested. This island was waterless and had no beach, but provided an excellent vantage point from which to observe activities in the roadstead.

During the afternoon of 26 Sep 43 targets were detailed. By 1900 hrs the canoes were loaded and the parties embarked for the second attack. Target area for Canoe No. 1 (Lyon) was the Examination Anchorage, that of Canoe No. 2 (Davidson) was Keppel Harbour and the Roads, while Canoe No. 3 (Page) was allotted Palau Bukum Wharf. Each canoe was allotted an alternative area in case access to the primary area was not possible for any reason.

Lyon and Page in Canoes 1 & 3 decided to remain together during the approach to the target area. They paddled at an easy pace, making good progress on the cross- tide, pausing only when the Blakang Mati searchlights shone uncomfortable close to them. At 2130 hrs they were in the vicinity of Palau Jong, where they parted company.

Lyon arrived in his target area at around 2230 hrs to find all shipping, except tankers, completely blacked out and completely invisible against a background of hills. After some searching here they located a ship, but a closer inspection showed that it was in Page’s area. When the time limit was almost exhausted, Lyon and Huston decided to attack a tanker, two of which were clearly distinguishable by their red riding lights. They made a direct approach from astern, and placed two limpets abreast the engine room and one on the propeller shaft. With their task only half completed, Huston drew Lyon’s attention to a man who was watching them intently from a porthole 10 feet above. The man continued to look in their direction until just before they left the ship, then he withdrew his head and lit his bedside lamp. Apparently the observer took no action. The task completed, the canoe set off on the 12 mile journey to Dongas which was reached at 0515 hrs.

After leaving Lyon, Page in No. 3 canoe headed towards his first target, the wharves at Palau Bukum, which was reached at 2200 hours. He examined the whole length of the wharves, finding only one suitable target, an old freighter, possibly of the Tone Maru class. A large tanker and a nondescript “engines-aft” vessel were tied up at the wharf, but the former was too big and too fully laden to guarantee extensive damage or sinking and the latter was too small to warrant an attack. The wharves were lit normally and a sentry was stationed on the wharf near the bows of the tanker.

A group from Z Special Unit on board MV Krait during Operation Jaywick Left to right B3312 AB Andrew William George Huston RAN  66175 Major Ivan Lyon MBE  The Gordon Highlanders officer commanding .jpg

By 2300 hours the tide had turned and was running to the east. The first target, the freighter of the Tone Maru class, was attacked from the stern. With a following tide, Page and Jones paddled along Keppel Harbour towards the second target, a modern freighter later identified as the Nasusan Maru. Charges were placed on this vessel, and continuing, they attacked their third target, and old freighter, identified later as either the Yamataga Maru or the Nagano Maru. From this point, Page and Jones returned to Dongas which was reached at 0445 hrs.

When Davidson and Falls in No. 2 canoe had left Palau Subar for their target area, the flood tide made progress slow. However, by 2115 hrs they reached the passage. Their approach was uneventful, except for a searchlight on Blakang Mati which searched the sky every now and then. Keeping to the boat channel the tripod pylons of Keppel Harbour anti-submarine boom were picked up. A tug, burning navigation lights and bound to the south of Blakang Mati, nearly ran them down, but they were not sighted. At the Tanjong Pagar end, they found the boom gate open and no boom vessel in attendance. Inside the boom against the east wharf were two ships but they were too small to be worthy of attack. At the main wharf there was no shipping, and the shipping in the Empire Docks was too brilliantly lit and too small to warrant attack.

They turned back, re-crossed the boom and headed for the Roads.

In the Roads there were many excellent targets. Three of the largest cargo vessels were selected for attack. The first was 5-6000 ton cargo vessel, heavily laden; the second a 5-6000 ton “engines aft” cargo vessel, later identified as the Taisyo Maru; and the third a 5-6000 ton “engines aft” vessel unladen. Each ship was attacked on the port side, away from Singapore’s lights.

After attaching the charges, they left the Roads at 0115 hrs and headed for the Rhio Straits. They halted at a point of land 6 miles W of Palau Nongsa, leaving again at 1900 hrs on 27 Sep 43 and proceeded to Palau Tanjong Sau, where they landed about 0430 hours on 28 Sep 43. Leaving again at 1900 hrs, they moved by way of Palau Lepang, Tanjong Piayu, Palau Anak Mati, the Setoko Channel between Palau Rempang and Palau Setoki, to Otter bay, Panjang Island, arriving early on the 29th.

During the day on 29 Sep 43 they rested at Otter Bay. At 1900 hrs they set off on the last leg to Ponpong. When they were four miles from Palau Abang Besar, a violent storm arose, through which they kept the canoe afloat with the greatest difficulty. After some hours of battling, the storm subsided as quickly as it had arisen. They reached Abang Besar safely on the morning of 30 Sep 43. After resting there, they proceeded at 1900 hrs, arriving at Pompong on 1 Oct 43 for the rendezvous with the ‘Krait’, which was effected at 0015 hrs on 2 Oct 43.

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Meanwhile the crews of canoes 1 and 3 had met at Dongas at 0510 hrs on 27 Sep 43. Lyon set up an OP to observe the results of the attack. Between 0515 and 0550 hours on the 27th, a total of seven explosions were heard, indicating that all the attacks had been successful. Four of these explosions had come from the direction of Examination Anchorage and Palau Bukum, while the others had come from the roads area. As the sun rose the Examination Anchorage could be clearly observed. One ship was seen sunk by the stern with her bows protruding from the water. A tanker was burning fiercely and belching forth thick black smoke, which almost entirely covered the area. Owing to the haze and the smoke no other results could be seen.

Fifteen minutes after the first explosion, ship sirens started, and after another fifteen minutes Singapore and Sambu were blacked out. At dawn some ships were seen to be under weigh and aimlessly cruising about. After the initial confusion in which the scene was one of utter bedlam, there was considerable activity of small harbour craft in the target areas, and motor launches patrolled the north coast of Batam Island. Air searches were made continuously throughout the day.

After observing results during 27 Sep 43, canoes 1 and 3 moved off at dusk to the rendezvous at Pompong. They had expected to encounter searchlights and patrols around Sambu, but in fact conditions had by this time settled down to normal. Arriving at the north entrance to the Bulan Strait, they saw a small ship lying at anchor but they drifted past it on the tide without being seen. Being understandably exhausted, they decided to make camp at the first suitable location. They found an excellent hideout in what turned out to be a Chinese graveyard.

On the night of 28 Sep 43 they continued their journey without incident to Bulat, thence to Otter Bay, Panjang Is. where they arrived in the midst of a violent storm in the early hours of the 30th.

They had hoped to cover the first 12 miles of the journey to Pompong on the night of the 30th, but heavy cloud banks to the west indicated there would be another storm, so they decided to postpone their departure until the following morning. To risk a day passage of 28 miles was a very serious decision, but it was justified by the violent storm that later developed.

On the morning of 1 Oct 43 the two canoes left Panjang, one setting off an hour before the other. All day they paddled against a head wind. Several aircraft flew overhead without taking the slightest interest, and they must have been clearly visible to the Japanese OP on Ngoel. However they arrived without incident at Palau Torte, where they rested for an hour before starting on the 16 mile journey to Pompong.

Both canoes reached Pompong at 0300 hrs on 2 Oct 43 and circumnavigated the island in search of the ‘Krait’. The rendezvous had been arranged for between dusk and dawn on the night of 1/2 Oct 43, but neither canoe could find trace of her in the anchorage. They slept on the beach until dawn, when they stowed the canoes in the jungle. While they were doing this, they saw the ‘Krait’ about two miles away, heading down the Temiang Strait. So great had been their fatigue on the previous night, that they had paddled to and fro in the anchorage without being able to see the boat.

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Searching the island, they found traces of a newly vacated camp site. It seemed probable that Davidson had succeeded in keeping the rendezvous, and that ‘Krait’, knowing the adverse weather conditions of the previous two nights, would return later. Meanwhile, Lyon, Page, Huston and Jones began to organise themselves for a stay of several weeks on Pompong. Page started to build a hut, Lyon contacted some friendly Malays, who promised to supply the party with fish and vegetables for as long as they cared to stay on the island. At this time, the party intended to seize a native sailing vessel and sail to India on the change of the monsoon.

Their problems were solved however by the return of the ‘Krait’ at 2200 hrs on 3 Oct 43. They were immediately taken aboard and the vessel sailed for Australia.

The return voyage through the Java Sea was uneventful. At dusk on 11 Oct 43 they entered Lombok Strait. So successful had they been so far that the entire party had a feeling of supreme confidence. This was shaken rudely by the appearance of a Japanese patrol vessel. However ‘Krait’ was not challenged and the enemy vessel moved off. By dawn ‘Krait’ had passed the straits and was out of sight of land on a direct heading for Exmouth Gulf, which was reached at dawn on 19 Oct 43.

The operation had occupied 48 days, during which 4000 miles of enemy waters had been traversed without casualty or mishap.

Damage resulting from Jaywick, based on intelligence gathered subsequent to the return of the expedition was as follows: -

Sunk:

1 freighter of 3,180 tons, possibly of the Yamagata Maru class.

Damaged/probably sunk:

1 freighter of the Nasusan Maru class. 1 freighter 3,802-4,070 tons, possibly of the Tone Maru class. 1 freighter Taisyo Maru of 4,816 tons. 2 freighters unidentified, each of 5,000 to 6,000 tons.

Damaged and Burning:

1 tanker Sinkoku Maru of 10,020 tons

Total Tonnage affected:

36,843 to 39,111

RIMAU, SINGAPORE hARBOUR OCT-NOV 43

Following the successful Jaywick raid on shipping in Singapore Harbour in 1943, another attack on this target was planned in Aug 44, under the name of Rimau. The Rimau plan provided for an attack by 15 MSCs in place of the 3 folboats used by Jaywick. Target areas included the man-of-war and explosive anchorages, mosquito fleet, Keppel Harbour, Empire Dock and wharves at Bukum and Sambu Islands.

The original plans were prepared in London and provided for the approach to be made by SRD Country craft by way of the Natuna Islands. Many factors prevented the plan being carried out on the original lines.